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In assessing relative deprivation, the classical approach considers that individuals compare their 
income with each and every income of the distribution, and assign equal weight to these 
comparisons. In this paper we propose a more realistic alternative approach to obtain individual 
deprivation. We assume that the deprivation of the individual depends, to a greater extent, on the 
situation of those who are part of their social environment (neighbors, colleagues, family, or, in 
general, the individual’s reference group) rather tan on the situation of those in an unattainable 
situation from the individual’s point of view. In developing their aspirations, individuals focus on 
the group to which they belong or at least, they fel they are likely to belong to. As a particular 
case, our proposal includes the classical approach, allowing us to explain some situations that do 
not fall under the assumptions of that approach. 
 
Keywords: Inequality, inter-individual comparisons, reference groups, weighting 
functions.  












An individual feels deprived when he compares himself with other individuals who he 
considers to be better off. The economic literature on deprivation usually defines this concept in 
terms of income. Income is frequently considered an indicator of the individual’s ability to own or 
consume commodities. Under this assumption, the intrrelation between individual or social 
deprivation and income distribution inequality becomes evident. From an economic standpoint1, 
Runciman’s (1966) approach has had the greatest impact. He defines that a person is relatively 
deprived of Y when (i) he does not have Y; (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may 
include himself at some previous or expected time, as having Y; (iii) he wants Y; and (iv) he sees 
it as feasible that he should have Y. 
Yitzhaki (1979) presented the first proposal to quantify deprivation from an individual 
and social level taking as a reference the income distribution in a population, while Hey and 
Lambert (1980) provide an alternative motivation to the same expression2. They identify the 
deprivation felt by an individual with respect to another individual with income y, ,xy >  with the 
difference .xy −  The interest of this approach is twofold. On the on  hand, the results derived 
from this definition allow social welfare functions consistent with the Gini index (1914) to be 
obtained once it is proved that the mean social deprivation equals the absolute Gini index. On the 
other hand, this formulation provides a logical sequential order in its reasoning: (i) it explicitly 
indicates how to make inter-individual comparisons, something essential in this type of 
formulations; (ii) deprivation associated with a given level of income is then obtained; and (iii) 
mean social deprivation is finally determined. 
Other references related to deprivation in terms of income are Yitzhaki (1982), 
Chakravarty and Chakraborty (1984), Berrebi and Silber (1985), Paul (1991), Chakravarty et al. 
(1995), Podder (1996), Chakravarty (1997), Chakravarty nd Mukherjee (1998), Imedio et al. 
(1999), Ebert and Moyes (2000), Duclos (2000), Imedio and Bárcena (2003), Chakravarty (2007), 
Imedio and Bárcena (2008), Magdalou and Moyes (2009), Yitzhaki (2010), and Imedio et al. 
(2012). These studies propose alternative definitions f deprivation that allow different inequality 
measures such as the Bonferroni (1930) index, the De Vergottini (1940) index, and the generalized 
Gini indexes (Yitzhaki, 1983) to be interpreted as social deprivation measures. 
When the notion of relative deprivation is invoked, one inevitably confronts difficult 
questions about how people actually evaluate their position in society (Pedersen, 2004). It is 
therefore necessary to take into account several aspects when formulating relative deprivation. 
First, an individual’s deprivation, given his income level, depends on the group he belongs to or 
identifies with and on the group of individuals within which he confines his aspirations. Second, 
once we define the function that assigns deprivation to each income level, social deprivation can 
be assessed as the mean value of this function. Alternatively, it is possible to use weights that 
                                                 
1 This concept initially appeared in studies in the field of sociology to justify certain aspects of collective 
behavior. We can highlight those of Stouffer et al. (1949), Davis (1959), Runciman (1966), Gurr (1968) and 
Crosby (1976, 1979). 
2 This definition is motivated by Runciman (1966): “…relative deprivation is the extent of the differenc  
between the desired situation and that of the person desiring it ” 
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discriminate between the different parts of the distribution by assigning different importance to the 
deprivation associated with each income level. That is, in the same way that each index in the 
measurement of inequality incorporates its own criteria to add the information contained in the 
distribution according to the value judgments that underlie it, we can introduce different attitudes 
when assessing mean social deprivation through the use of weights. This is the case in Imedio et 
al. (2012), and it allows the indices of the β class (Imedio et al. 2009, 2010) – which includes, 
among others, the generalized Gini indices, the family introduced by Aaberge (2007) and the one 
by Imedio et al. (2011) – to be interpreted as social deprivation measures.  
Pedersen (2004) called for a sociologically inspired normative theory that takes seriously 
the possibility that not all comparisons within the larger society are equally relevant for social 
(self-)evaluation. As mentioned above, Imedio et al. (2012) answers the call corresponding to 
social evaluation by giving priority to deprivation associated to different parts of the income 
distribution. This paper answers the call corresponding to self evaluation by introducing an 
alternative approach that considers that the deprivation felt by an individual depends to a greater 
extent on the situation of those who are part of their immediate social environment (neighbors, 
colleagues, family or the reference group in general) rather than on the situation of those in an 
unattainable situation from the individual’s point of view. Individuals develop their aspirations by 
focusing on those who belong to the group3 into which they are integrated or at least the group 
they could potentially belong to. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that it is the individual, 
and not the social evaluator, who introduces a weightin  scheme to add the deprivation he feels 
with respect to those with incomes greater than his own. 
We assume that when the individual compares his income with similar or close ones he 
feels a more acute deprivation than when he compares it with remote incomes. We can even admit 
the possibility of ignoring incomes from a level deemed inaccessible. This is equivalent to 
assuming that individuals can consider only one range of the income distribution when evaluating 
their deprivation. This censoring of reference incomes can be justified by Runciman’s view (1966, 
p.29) that “people often choose reference groups clo er to their actual circumstances than those 
which might be forced on them if their opportunities were better than they are”.  
We believe that this paper brings more realism to the opic when obtaining the 
deprivation associated to each income level. The literature on this issue considers that each 
individual compares his income with each and every income of the distribution, assigning equal 
importance to all comparisons. That is, it is assumed that the reference group of each individual is 
the entire income distribution, and that all incomes have the same relevance. Relaxing these 
assumptions leads to some formal difficulties and the need to subjectively choose some elements 
involved in the analysis such as the length of the int rvals where individuals make comparisons, 
the selection of weights used, etc. In this way, mean social deprivation is not, in general, a 
common measure of inequality. However, as it is a generalization of the classical approach, it will 
be included as a special case in which mean social deprivation is the absolute Gini index. 
                                                 
3 Although the reference groups can be formed in respon e to different variables, this paper considers that 
they are determined by income alone, as we discuss below. 
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In this approach, in which each individual only compares effectively with those of his 
immediate environment, social deprivation is lower than that obtained in the classical approach in 
which each individual compares with everyone else. This may help to explain why societies with 
high levels of inequality (according to the usual indexes) can show low levels of deprivation which 
do not always lead to social conflict. Therefore, the inequality perceived by individuals that belong 
to the distribution may be significantly lower than the inequality perceived by a social evaluator 
that simply evaluates it through a classic index. In an extreme case, if we consider perfect 
stratification where the population is divided into “classes” with the aspirations of members of 
each “class” limited to that class, or if we consider a policy designer that convinces each group to 
stick to their own folks with no cross-group comparison, society can tolerate large inequalities 
with a low level of deprivation. Popular images of feudal hierarchies or of social structures based 
on caste systems are examples of such deeply divide societies. In the most extreme case where 
the number of groups approaches the number of members in the society, high inequality can 
prevail with zero deprivation (Yitzhaki, 2010). In this sense, the relative deprivation theory could 
be applied to explain social conflict and struggle (Korpi, 1974; Chandra and Foster, 2005). As 
Runciman (1966) argued, there does not seem to be a strong correlation between the level of 
"class-political discontent" and objective indicators of inequality so this discontent is instead 
related to the gap which exists between one's economic and social conditions and the perceived 
conditions of some reference group. 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section introduces the analytical 
framework and presents the classical approach in the s udy of deprivation. The third section 
develops our proposal, which consists of weighting deprivation among individuals depending on 
the degree of proximity between their respective situations (income levels). The fourth section 
includes an empirical illustration for two countries, considering different weighting functions. 
Finally, some brief conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Analytical framework: The classical definition of 
deprivation  
Let us assume that the income distribution of a population is denoted by the random variable X 
whose domain is the semi-straight positive real, ),,0[R ∞=+  where )F(⋅  is its distribution 
function, and <==µ ∫
∞
0
)x(xdF)X(E ∞ its mean income. 
The associated Lorenz curve, L(p), ),x(F=  is defined by: 





=→ ∫ . [1] 
For each ),x(Fp =  L(p) is the proportion of total income accumulated by the set of units with an 
income less than or equal to x. It is clear that for ,1p0 ≤≤  .p)p(L ≤  In the case of perfect 
equality, ,p)p(L =  and 0)p(L =  for ,1p0 <≤  1)1(L =  if there is maximum concentration. 
For any distribution, X, the Lorenz curve is not decreasing and convex. 
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L(p)dp21L(p))dp(p2G .  [2] 
Its value is twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality. 













−=−= . [3] 
G∈[0, 1], G=0 if there is perfect equality, and G=1 in the case of maximum concentration. This is 
a compromise index, that is, a relative measure (invar ant under changes of scale) which becomes 
an absolute index (invariant under changes of origin) when multiplied by the average income, thus 
leading to the absolute Gini index, .Gµ  
If income is a discrete variable represented by NN21 R), x, , x(xx +∈= L
r
, with 









 is the population mean. When considering the cumulative 
shares of population Ni1}N/i{ ≤≤ , the Lorenz curve provides their respective shares in total 
income Ni1)}N/i(L{ ≤≤ , with 









The graph of )L(⋅ is given by the points 0) ,0( , Ni1L(i/N))} {(i/N, ≤≤  and the polygonal 


























































=  [5]  
The following definition is the starting point of the classical approach in the analysis of 
deprivation (Yitzhaki, 1979; Hey and Lambert, 1980).  
Definition. The deprivation felt by an individual with income x with respect to an individual with 







x  .   y   if,         0
x y  x  ,  ify
D(x,y)  [6]  
Hence, the deprivation felt by an individual with a given income level is given by the income 
difference with respect to those richer than him, and it is zero with respect to those that have less 
income. 
When comparing a given income level x with each and every one of the income 
distribution and averaging the resulting differences according to their density4, we obtain the mean 
                                                 
4 Runciman defines the degree of deprivation inherent in ot having Z when others have it as an increasing 
function of the proportion of persons in the referenc  group who have Z. Using promotions as an example, 
6 
value of the deprivation associated with income level x, D (x). This function has the following 
expression5: 







∫∫  [7] 
where 
)F(x)(1L(F(x)))µ(1) M[x,)M[x −−=∞≡+   [8] 
is the mean income of individuals with income greater than or equal to x. 
Therefore, )x(D  is the product of the proportion of individuals with ncome greater than 
x, F(x)1− , and the difference between the mean income of such a group and x. 
)(D ⋅  satisfies the following properties:  
(i) )(D ⋅  is a strictly decreasing function of the level of income  
(ii) µ)0D( =  
(iii) ,0D(x) →  if .x ∞→  
Another way of expressing D(x) in terms of )x(Fp =  using the first derivative of the 
Lorenz curve, µ== xdp)p(dL)p(L' , is: 
)p1)(p(L))p(L1()x(D ' −µ−−µ= . [9] 
The expected value of the function )(D ⋅  is the mean social deprivation. This value, 






In the previous approach each individual compares his income with all others in the 
distribution and the same treatment is applied to all the values that result from these comparisons 
when computing the mean deprivation associated with each income level. No other circumstances 
are taken into account. Thus, the poorest individuals of the population experience deprivation with 
respect to the situation of the richest. In doing so, each individual weights his deprivation with 
respect to those with a higher income with the same intensity, including the deprivation resulting 
from comparisons with income levels considered inaccessible. A more realistic approach in 
assessing the deprivation of an individual involves the possibility of discriminating between those 
with higher incomes according to his own perceptions r aspirations. 
In the next section we propose a procedure to take into account, at least partially, this new 
point of view when obtaining the deprivation of every income level and, from it, the social 
deprivation. 
 
                                                                                                                            
Runciman (1966, p.19) writes: “The more people a mansees promoted when he is not promoted himself, the 
more people he may compare himself with in a situation where the comparison will make him feel relatively 
deprived”. 
5 Proof of the results of this work are available from the authors upon request. 
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3. Weighted deprivation depending on the proximity 
of individuals 
We continue assuming that the deprivation experienced by an individual with income x 
with respect to another individual with income y, D(x, y) is given by the previous definition. Now, 
given income level x, rather than proceeding as in [7] to assess the deprivation attached to income 
x, the differences xy − , x,y >  are weighted by a function, ++ →⋅ 00hx, RR :)(ω , where 
), 0[R0 ∞=
+ , whose support is the interval ,h]x[x, +  ,0h >  therefore, ,0)y(h,x =ω  









hx,hx, 1.(y)(y)dFω(y)(y)dFω    [11] 
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h,xyx,    
F(x)h)F(x
F(x)F(y)
x,       y         ,        0
(y)Fx,h
         
       
         
 [12]  
The above conditions ensure that: (a) the individual with income x does not; in fact, feel 
deprivation in relation to incomes greater than ,hx + ;0h >  (b) the differences x,y −  ,xy >  
are assigned a decreasing or constant weight; and (c) )(ωx,h ⋅ is actually a weighting function. 
We also assume that the kind of function to which )(ωx,h ⋅  belongs is the same for all 
+∈ 0Rx  and that the value of 0h >  remains constant along the income scale. That is, the width of 
the intervals that individuals consider to be relevant in assessing deprivation is identical for all of 
them and the weighting criteria also coincides. These conditions, which are certainly restrictive, 
make the analytical treatment of the problem tractable. 
Under the previous assumptions, if (x)Dω  is the deprivation associated to income x 
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x,hx,hω (y)(y)dFyωh][x, xM  [14] 
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is the weighted mean income of the interval ],h xx,[ +  using )(ωx,h ⋅ as the weighting function. 
When each individual compares his income effectively to all those with a greater income, 
we are assuming that ∞→h , that is, the support of the weighting function, now denoted as 
















.xy   ,
)x(F1
)x(F)y(F
,xy                    ,0
(y)Fx  [15] 





xxω (y)dF(y)x)ω(y(y)dF(y)y)ωD(x,(x)D  





∫  [16] 
where )[xMω
+  is the weighted mean income of those individuals with an income greater than x.  
 
Expressions [13] and [16] present a clear analogy with [7]. (x)Dω is the product of the 
proportion of individuals whose income belongs to the interval h]xx,[ +  (or the half line ) ,x[ ∞ ) 
and the difference between the weighted mean income of the interval (or half line) and income x. 
The characteristics of function )(Dω ⋅  depend on: 
- The weighting function, )(ω hx, ⋅   
- The width of the interval in which the individual makes his comparisons 
- The shape of the underlying income distribution function, )(F ⋅  
It is immediate that when ∞→x , 0,(x)D →ω  that is, property (iii) of ).(D ⋅ in the 
classical approach is still satisfied. However, )(Dω ⋅ , in general, does not satisfy properties (i) and 
(ii). We cannot assure that )(Dω ⋅  is a strictly decreasing function of income. As weshall see 
below, in specific cases, )(Dω ⋅  may be increasing in some parts of the distribution. 
By averaging the deprivation associated with each in ome level )(Dω ⋅  along the entire 











−=  [18] 
The above expressions are similar to [10] that provides the absolute Gini index, µG, when 
averaging all income differences ,xy −  ,xy >  across the distribution, without discriminating 
between them. Therefore, we can say that [17] and [18] are generalizations of the absolute Gini 
index when the above differences are weighted with the functions )(ω hx, ⋅  or )(ωx ⋅ , with both 
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expressions depending on the type of weighting functio  and, in the first case, also on h, the width 
of the interval in which the individual makes comparisons. In particular, µG is obtained when 
∞→h  and 1,(y)ωx =  xy > , 
+∈ 0Rx .  
It is clear that the mean social deprivation obtained from expressions [17] or [18] is zero 
if there is an egalitarian distribution of income. However, the mean social deprivation will also be 
zero when there is an egalitarian distribution in the reference group of each and every one of the 
individuals. Again, the perception of the individual t kes precedence over the general view that an 
outside observer may have of the distribution, thus justifying that situations of high inequality 
without social conflict can occur. 
 
Particular cases for different weights 















)y(h,x  [19] 
In this case the individual follows a uniform criteon in his reference group when assessing 
deprivation. 









ω (y)x)dF(yF(x))h)(F(xx)dF(y)(y(x)D  
 ,xh] xF(x))(M[x,h)(F(x )         −+−+=  [20]  
where ]hx ,x[M +  is the mean income in the interval ]hxx,[ + . 








whose value depends on h.  
 
2. Constant weight with ∞→h . If in the previous case we assume ∞→h , the individual does 
not discriminate between higher incomes depending on the proximity to his own income, that is, if 










ω µ=−= ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
. 
For the constant weight referred to in the first case, the individual with income x assigns 
the same importance to the deprivation he feels with respect to higher incomes up to ,hx +  but 
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attaches a zero weight to deprivation felt with respect to ε++ hx , ε  positive and arbitrarily 
small. There is, therefore, an abrupt jump in assigning weights. This circumstance can be avoided 
by considering weights with a more or less marked dcreasing rate. 
 














)y(h,x  [21] 
parameters a and b are determined by imposing that )(ωx,h ⋅ satisfies the condition [11] and that 
its graph passes through the point ),0h, (x + so that from hx +  the weight is zero. By imposing 
these two conditions: 
 .0)hx(ab    ,0))hx(]h x,x[M(1a >+−=<+−+=  
In applying [13] and [17], we obtain the deprivation associated to each income level and 
the mean social deprivation.  
The previous examples contain only the simplest types of weighting function, particularly 
the one giving rise to the classical approach. Of course there are many possibilities for selecting 
weighting functions with different rates of decline and supports. 
 
4. Illustration 
As noted above, weighted deprivation associated with an income level depends on the 
weighting function chosen, on the width of the interval in which the individual performs his 
comparisons, and on the shape of the underlying income distribution. In this section we illustrate 
these properties using the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions6 (EU-SILC) for 
the year 2009. We define deprivation in terms of the monthly gross income of employees. 
We first check the effect of the weighting function employed. To do so, we use the 
Spanish income distribution considering four weights: (i) the constant weight considering an 
interval with a width equal to the mean income; (ii) the decreasing linear weighting function with 
the same interval as in the previous case; (iii) the normal weighting function truncated from the 
mode, in this case individuals compare with all higher incomes in the distribution; and (iv) the 
constant weighting function when the width of the interval tends to infinity, which is equivalent, as 
mentioned above, to the classical approach of Hey and Lambert (1980). The corresponding 
deprivation functions are represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Weighting deprivation functions for Spain 2009 
                                                 
6 This is an instrument that aims to collect timely and comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal 
multidimensional microdata on income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions. This instrument is 
















Note: D denotes Hey and Lambert’s (1980) definition of deprivation or constant deprivation with 
h→∞. Dw1 is the constant deprivation with an interval of width equal to mean income. DwL1 is 
the decreasing linear weighting function with an interval of width equal to mean income. DwN1 is 
the normal weighting function truncated from the mode. 
Figure 1 above shows that, for each income level, th  lowest deprivation is the one that 
considers the decreasing linear weighting where the deprivation associated to the constant 
weighting function is slightly higher. Both are dominated by the deprivation function obtained for 
a normal weight, whose value depends on its variance. The highest levels of deprivation result 
from applying the classical approach (Hey and Lambert, 1980). 
To verify the effect of interval width given the income distribution and the weighting 
function, we compare the deprivation functions in Spain obtained with the constant weight by 
considering two different amplitude ranges: mean income and 50% of the mean income (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Deprivation function with constant weight function considering mean income as the 














Figure 2 shows that, for the given distribution and the given weighting function, by 
increasing the width of the interval in which indivi uals compare with others, the deprivation 
associated with each income level also increases. Moreover, the Dw05 curve shows that the 
weighted deprivation function is not necessarily decreasing or convex. 
In order to illustrate that the weighted deprivation also depends on the underlying 
distribution function, we consider the income distribution in Greece for 2009, whose density 
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function is significantly different from that of Spain as shown in Figure 3. The Greek income 
distribution displays a local mode. 
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a) Spain    b) Greece 
The weighted deprivation functions for Greece are represented in Figure 4 using the same 
assumptions as for Spain in Figure 1. Comparing the two graphs, we find that the deprivation 
functions for Greece are influenced by the underlying bimodal distribution. Abrupt changes occur 
in the weighted deprivation functions, specifically about 2000 euros in income. Around this level 
of income, the interval where the individual make comparisons begins to include the local mode 
shown in Figure 3.b. 













Note: D denotes Hey and Lambert’s (1980) definition of deprivation or constant deprivation with 
h→∞. Dw1 is the constant deprivation with an interval of width equal to mean income. DwL1 is 
the decreasing linear weighting function with an interval of width equal to mean income. DwN1 is 
the normal weighting function truncated from the mode. 
In this case, unlike in the classical approach, it becomes clear that deprivation may 
increase in certain segments of the distribution. In the income distribution for Greece there is a 
segment of incomes with low density (incomes lower than the local mode) and subsequent 
segments with higher density. Therefore, when considering the constant weight or the linear 
decreasing weight, an individual that compares his income with higher incomes in a low density 
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interval will experience less deprivation than another individual with a higher income, but who 
makes comparisons on an interval with higher density. This explains the possibility that 
individuals will experience a lower deprivation than others with higher incomes.  
Of course, the influence of the underlying distribut on will be greater the smaller the 
width of the interval in which the individual makes comparisons or the greater the decreasing rate 
of the weighting function. 
The following table shows the values of the mean social weighted deprivation for the 
various weighting functions considered in Greece and Spain. 
Table 1. Mean social weighted deprivation considering different weighting functions (euros) 
  Spain Greece 
D 522.7 329.3 
Dw1 288.1 170.9 
DwL1 256.7 151.3 
DwN1 297.1 163.1 
µ (mean) 1781.1 1335.3 
Note: D denotes Hey and Lambert’s (1980) definition of deprivation or constant deprivation with 
h→∞. Dw1 is the constant deprivation with an interval of width equal to mean income. DwL1 is 
the decreasing linear weighting function with an interval of width equal to mean income. DwN1 is 
the normal weighting function truncated from the mode. 
The results shown in the previous table are consistent with the relationship between the 
graphs of the respective deprivation functions. The highest mean social deprivation is the one 
corresponding to the classical approach. Given the width of interval, h, the mean social deprivation 
obtained by weighting with a constant weighting function is greater than that obtained with a 
decreasing linear weighting function. The relationship of these values with those resulting from 
applying a normal weight depends on the shape of the normal function, which is determined by its 
variance. Moreover, for each of the cases considered, m an social deprivation in Spain is higher 
than in Greece as a consequence not only of the characteristics of their distributions, but, above all,
of the difference between mean incomes. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Any formulation of relative deprivation has an underlying set of value judgments and normative 
aspects are therefore present. The characteristics of the income distribution influence the 
assessment of deprivation at both individual and social levels, but the specification of a set of 
subjective criteria to try to take into account thebehavior of individuals is also required. 
The main difference between the approach of this work and the classical approach is that 
we assume that, in assessing their deprivation, individuals discriminate between those closer to 
them in their reference group (because they have a similar situation or at least a situation 
considered to be attainable) and those who are in situations that they perceive as inaccessible. This 
distinction between "close" and "remote" is modulated by the use of weights. When the reference 
group of each individual is the total population and equal importance is given to each comparison, 
we obtain the results of the classical approach and the mean social deprivation coincides with the 
absolute Gini index. 
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Our proposal introduces a more realistic assessment of deprivation. It allows justifying 
that deprivation is not necessarily a decreasing fuction of income, that is, higher income does not 
always mean less deprivation. As Runciman (1966) suggested, if groups that are fairly well off 
tend to compare themselves with even more privileged strata, this could explain why they are 
sometimes more discontent than genuinely (read: objectively) poor people as the latter presumably 
tend to be much more modest in their choice of reference group. Moreover, an outside observer 
may evaluate inequality with the usual index although this assessment may not be shared by the 
members of that society. For example, a sharply polarized income distribution (i.e. poor and rich 
with a small middle class) presents a high inequality index by applying a classic index. At the 
same time, the mean weighted social deprivation could be small if non-overlapping reference 
groups of individuals are placed at different poles. This view may explain the lack of social protest 
in situations of high inequality. 
Finally, the formation of each individual’s referenc  group is key to assessing individual 
and social deprivation. In this work we have assumed that the reference groups are determined 
solely by level of income, and have the same width for all individuals. Of course, the specification 
of the relevant reference population is debatable, and as we have seen in the illustration, it is likely 
to affect the results of social evaluation. Future research is needed to ensure that the formation of 
such groups is an endogenous decision made by the individual. In this respect we would need to 
introduce a wide spectrum of dimensions correlated to the notion of within-group identity that aid 
in assessing the formation of the reference group. 
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